Does being different matter? by Finn E. Kydland & D'Ann M. Petersen
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One does not have to look far to notice
that, in the real world, people are different.
Individuals are of different ages and may have
different attributes, such as varying educational
achievements or on-the-job skills. There are
many real-world examples of why individual
differences may matter for economic policy.
Some of these examples are related to demo-
graphic issues, such as how a population that is
getting proportionally older will influence future
savings and interest rates or increase the possi-
bility of higher tax burdens for future workers.
(See Figure 1 for an illustration of how the pop-
ulation distribution is expected to change.)
Another example in which individual differ-
ences matter is the question of immigration’s
impact on society and whether immigrants will
reduce the need for higher taxes or increase the
burden on the government.
Economists have long conjectured that 
the best answers to such questions come from
models that are inhabited by people—because
people make decisions that have implications
for the actual economy. Only recently have
economists been able to compute the outcomes
of models with large numbers of individuals 
at every stage of the life cycle. Before the 1990s
and high-speed computers, solving such models
was computationally infeasible. Nevertheless,
economists found that they could abstract 
from life-cycle differences and still get reli-
able answers to many macroeconomic ques-
tions, especially those relating to growth and
business cycles.
In this article, we outline a general frame-
work appropriate for addressing most quanti-
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In this article, we outline 
a general framework 
appropriate for addressing 
most quantitative 
macroeconomic issues.…The
research we highlight examines
an aging population’s impact
on savings and/or interest rates
and the quantitative impact of
immigration policy on savings
rates and fiscal policy.
Figure 1
Age Distribution of the U.S. Population, 
1994 and 2020
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requires building artificial economies that repli-
cate (to the degree needed) actual economies,
with many mortal individuals making decisions
over their lifetimes. Such a framework is ideal
for addressing questions in which demographics
are at the heart of the issue, and it is presented
in the first section of the article.
We next introduce a special case of our
general framework that abstracts from life-cycle
differences, an assumption that makes solving
the model computationally much easier. Econo-
mists have found such a framework useful for
addressing growth and business-cycle issues for
which life-cycle behavior is not essential. The
section also discusses how such a framework
can be used to incorporate some individual 
differences—such as skill differences—into 
the model without adding much computational
difficulty.
The final section of this article showcases
examples of current work that addresses ques-
tions for which life-cycle differences matter. The
examples illustrate the type of policy-relevant
questions that can be addressed using the 
mortal consumer framework presented in the
first section. In particular, the research we high-
light examines an aging population’s impact on
savings and/or interest rates and the quanti-
tative impact of immigration policy on savings
rates and fiscal policy.
The macroeconomist’s tool kit
In 1980, Robert Lucas (the 1995 Nobel
Prize recipient in economics) described the type
of model framework he believes might best
serve economists addressing macroeconomic
questions. He states, “One of the functions of
theoretical economics is to provide fully articu-
lated, artificial economic systems that can serve
as laboratories in which policies that would be
prohibitively expensive to experiment with in
actual economies can be tested out at much
lower cost…(Lucas 1980, 696). Our task as I see
it…is to write a FORTRAN program that will
accept specific economic policy rules as ‘input’
and will generate as ‘output’ statistics describing
the operating characteristics of time series we
care about, which are predicted to result from
these policies” (709–10). The desired environ-
ments Lucas refers to would make use of infor-
mation on “individual responses [that] can be
documented relatively cheaply...by means of
…censuses, panels [and] other surveys…” (710).
Lucas seems to suggest that economic
researchers place people in desired model envi-
ronments and record how they behave under
alternative policy rules.
In practice, Lucas’ suggestion is easier said
than done. All economic models are concerned
with the allocation of scarce resources. Accord-
ingly, these models must include a specification
of tastes (giving the rate at which people are
willing to sacrifice one good in exchange for
another) and a specification of technology 
(giving the rate at which one or more goods can
be physically transformed into others).
In our model, the goods are household
activity (time) and output. These goods can
either be consumed by households (as leisure
and consumption) or used (as labor and capital)
to produce more output. Tastes are represented
by a utility function that depends on the quan-
tities of leisure and output consumed now and
in the future. Technology is represented by a
production function that gives output as a 
function of labor and capital. Moreover, it is
assumed that goods are allocated across differ-
ent uses through markets: each good has a mar-
ket price at which it can be exchanged for other
goods. Finally, the economy is assumed to be
competitive: households take prices as given as
they try to maximize their utility. Details of this
model economy (which we call Economy 1) are
given in the box entitled “Economy 1: A General
Macroeconomic Framework.”
An important aspect of Economy 1 is that
each individual’s decisions about the present
are based on expectations about the future. This
is especially important when it comes to the
consumption–saving decision. For instance,
most people receive income from both labor
and assets over their lifetime. The individual
decides how much to consume now and how
much to consume later. The typical hump-
shaped lifetime labor earnings profile (a prod-
uct of the lifetime profile of hourly wages and
the lifetime profile of annual hours worked
shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively), com-
bined with a desire for a much less variable
consumption path, leads an individual to dis-
save (or borrow) in the early years, save around
the peak of earnings, and finally dissave while
approaching and entering retirement.
Computing the aggregate decisions of
Economy 1 is complicated for several reasons.
First, the economy at each time t includes people
at every stage of the life cycle. Second, as indi-
cated above, the market-clearing interest rate
depends on the aggregate of capital accumulated
up until period t, and the market-clearing wage
depends on the aggregate of labor input. The
consumption–saving decision depends on each
individual’s expectations of future asset returns,
or real interest rates, influenced by the aggre-4
gate of savings decisions up until that time. With
all these considerations, solving such a model is
difficult, especially when a lifetime consists of
many periods (meaning I is large) and there is
uncertainty. Indeed, this task was almost infea-
sible before the 1990s, given the computational
capacity of computers. With today’s computers,
however, if we define the functional forms for
the utility and production functions, and assign
values to the parameters and probability dis-
tributions to the random shocks, this model
economy can be used for computational experi-
ments of the kind Lucas envisioned in 1980.
Calibration. In a sense, model economies,
like thermometers, are measuring devices and
must be calibrated to provide reliable numerical
answers. Some economic questions have
known answers (just as we know what the ther-
mometer should read when dipped in boiling
water and in ice water), and the model should
give an approximately correct answer to them.
Thus, economists can use data to calibrate the
model economy so that it mimics the world as
closely as possible along a limited, but clearly
specified, number of dimensions. This way, one
will have more confidence in the model’s
answer to the question for which it was de-
signed. Of course, economic systems are differ-
ent from models used in the physical sciences,
where calibration is commonplace. Economic
models are inhabited by people who anticipate
and make decisions that are in their ex ante best
interest, given that other model people are
equally rational. However, in spite of this differ-
ence between physical and economic models,
the same principle applies: we have more con-
fidence in the answer to the question posed if
the model gives correct answers to questions for
which we already know the answer.
Part of the task of calibration involves
merely computing averages of relations among
aggregate data series. For example, if the stan-
dard Cobb–Douglas production function is 
used to describe the technology of the business
sector in Economy 1—that is, we let F(N,K) =
N
qK
1–q—then the model’s average labor share 
of aggregate national income equals q. Thus,
the parameter q can be quantified by computing
the average labor income as a percentage of
GDP over a period of years.
Because model economies are populated
by people, another source of calibration is 
averages across large numbers of the relevant
people in the actual economy. For instance,
Economy 1 employs a utility function in con-
sumption and leisure, which like the production
function mentioned above, is usually specified
with a share parameter. The empirical counter-
part to this parameter is households’ average
fraction of time spent in labor market activity.
This fraction can be obtained from panel data
covering large samples of individuals, such as
the Current Population Survey conducted by 
the Census Bureau. Moreover, the empirical
shape of the ei’s, describing the hump-shaped
lifetime earnings profile, can be estimated from
panel data.
A realistic approach: Immortal consumers
Because computing detailed models in-
habited by people at different stages of the life
cycle, as in Economy 1, is difficult, researchers
aiming for quantitative answers were initially
forced to scale down the ambition level of the
Figure 2
Life-Cycle Wage Profile
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questions addressed. In particular, researchers
attacked those questions for which certain 
simplifying assumptions were likely to do little
harm to the answers. Especially effective in
reducing the computational burden of such
detailed models was the assumption that 
everyone is alike and lives forever—immortal
consumers.
When considering long-run growth, life-
cycle behavior may not be among the most
important contributing factors. Similarly, econo-
mists conjectured that heterogeneity and/or life-
cycle behavior was not a big deal in answering
many business-cycle questions, such as how
much of postwar business cycles is accounted
for by technology shocks.
1 Thus emerged the
neoclassical growth model as a common 
framework for addressing growth and business-
cycle questions.
Consider a basic neoclassical growth
model framework with representative agents,
which we call Economy 2. This framework is 
a special case of Economy 1. The difference is
that in the representative agent framework, I
equals infinity (that is, immortal consumers) and
there are no hump-shaped earnings patterns
(that is, all ei’s in Economy 1 are set equal to
one). In such a framework (with no externali-
ties) it turns out that the equilibrium can be
computed by solving the optimization problem
of a fictitious social planner, whose objective
function corresponds to the utility function of
the typical individual:
subject to constraints B.1 and B.2. This property
dramatically reduces the dimension of the prob-
lem and saves a lot of computational detail,
thereby allowing the economist to solve the
model with much less difficulty.
This class of models—which obviously
abstracts from life-cycle behavior—still has an
important role for saving behavior. In a business-
cycle model, the impetus is cyclical income
volatility rather than life-cycle movements in
income. Such saving behavior may occur as
individuals attempt to smooth their consump-
tion over time even as income fluctuates,
thereby causing individuals to adjust the
amounts they save over different business-cycle
episodes.
Furthermore, the framework’s simplicity
makes it relatively easy to introduce additional
bells and whistles that are more crucial than 
heterogeneity.
2 More important for business-
cycle questions may be the fact that it takes
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many quarters to build new productive capital,
with newly produced investment goods being
allocated to its construction throughout the
building period. We can also introduce a role
for inventories or allow for increasing worker
productivity through on-the-job learning. The
interaction of household and market production
can be included in the framework.
3
The introduction of individual differences in
a business-cycle framework. Abstracting from
life-cycle behavior apparently does not hurt the
success of the representative agent model in
answering many business-cycle questions, but
completely abandoning heterogeneity does prove
problematic along at least one dimension. While
the early business-cycle models with technology
shocks as the main source of fluctuation display
considerable similarity between movements of
time series such as consumption, investment,
Economy 1: A General Macroeconomic Framework
This model economy attempts to capture the most important economic 
decisions over individuals’ lifetimes. Such an economy would be inhabited by many
generations of individuals who live for I periods (where I could correspond to an 
economic lifetime of about sixty years). People born in period t attempt to maximize
the expected value (denoted by E ) of a utility function of the form
subject to a budget constraint in every period:
Rt+i –1ai,t+i –1 + Wt+i –1eini,t+i –1 = ci,t+i –1 + ai,t+i , i = 1,…,I,
where ci is consumption, ni is market work and 1 – ni is leisure, and ai is asset hold-
ings, all at age i; R is the gross rate of return on assets; W is price per unit of labor
input; and ei is the person’s efficiency in production.Thus, Wei represents the real
wage per time unit. Possible additional restrictions are that a1t = 0 and aI,t+I ³ 0.The
maximization is over the lifetime sequences of ci’s and ni’s, and b denotes a discount
factor (implied by the utility rate of time preference) for comparing the utility of future
outcomes to that of the present.
The individuals in this economy cannot ignore what occurs in the rest of the
economy because present and future asset returns (R) and wage rates (W ), while
taken as given by each individual, are determined by the aggregate of all individuals’
decisions. With mi people in each generation i, suppose aggregate output is produced
according to the production function zt F(Nt,Kt), where z is the technology level and
the arguments represent aggregate labor and capital inputs, which in this case are
Then in equilibrium, asset returns R and labor-input compensation W will be de-
termined by the marginal products of capital and labor, respectively. Also, letting 
Ct = åi mi cit, the following aggregate feasibility constraint must be satisfied:
(B.1) Ct + Kt+1 £ ztF(Nt,Kt) + (1 – d)Kt,
where d is the capital’s depreciation rate.
A source of uncertainty in this model could be the technology level, whose
movement over time could be described by
(B.2) zt+1 = rzt + et+1.
The random disturbance to the technology, e, has a positive mean and variance s2.
Another stochastic element in this economy could be the number of newborns, m1, 
in every period.
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GDP, inventory holdings, and capital stock and
the corresponding ones in the data, the be-
havior of one key variable—hours of work—
appears somewhat anomalous. The hours
volatility in the data is substantially greater than
the standard business-cycle model would imply.
Because the hours of high-skill workers gener-
ally fluctuate much less than those of low-skill
workers, it is reasonable to think that this may
account for a large portion of the difference in
the actual and model-produced labor-input
series. An obvious way, then, to try to resolve
the issue of the labor-input anomaly is to modify
the model to include some heterogeneity in the
form of multiple skills.
Computational problems in dealing with
certain dimensions of heterogeneity relevant to
such business-cycle issues have been relatively
easy to deal with. For example, Kydland (1984)
constructs a business-cycle model with two
equal-sized groups of high- and low-skill work-
ers, each calibrated to be as skilled in market
production as the respective counterpart in the
data when workers are ranked by efficiency and
divided into two groups.
4 Moreover, the average
hours per period match actual observations—
that is, the high-skill workers on the average
work more hours to an extent corresponding to
actual data. The finding is that the model’s
volatility of aggregate hours, given volatility of
technology, increases substantially when skill
differences are taken into account. This simple
way of introducing heterogeneity into the
model still allows the equilibrium to be solved
as a fictitious planner’s problem.
Kydland’s modeling strategy allows for
only a limited number of distinct skills, while one
could argue that, in the actual economy, there
are as many skill levels as there are workers.
Table 1 illustrates differences across workers
when they are divided into five groups accord-
ing to average wage rates. The workers differ
both because they are at different stages of the
life cycle (as represented by their hump-shaped
ei’s in Economy 1) and because each age group
consists of workers whose abilities differ due to
differences in schooling, training, experience,
inherent talent for market work, and a host of
other reasons. This means that the entire sched-
ule of ei’s is different across these workers.
An alternative to the complication of
allowing for multiple skills within this frame-
work is to maintain the assumption of work-
force homogeneity but construct an improved
measure of Nt, or the labor input. Rather than
using the official figures for Nt (from either the
household survey or establishment survey),
which weight the hours of a janitor and those of
a brain surgeon equally, the better measure
would weight the hours of different workers by
their relative efficiencies. This approach has
been utilized by Kydland and Prescott (1993)
and Kydland and Petersen (1996). Using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics from the
University of Michigan, these researchers con-
struct quality-adjusted labor-input series consist-
ing of all demographic groups. Their findings
suggest that the constructed skill-adjusted labor-
input series fluctuates substantially less (by
almost one-third) than the corresponding aggre-
gate hours series published by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics and more closely resembles
the pattern generated by business-cycle models.
There are other reasons variants of busi-
ness-cycle models understate the volatility of
hours worked. One reason is that, taken liter-
ally, all of the labor-input volatility is in the 
form of variation in hours per worker (because
everyone is alike), rather than in the number of
workers. In the United States, however, about
two-thirds of the volatility in hours worked
comes in the form of the latter. With recent
advances in business-cycle theory, through
which movements in and out of the labor force
can be incorporated in the model (following the
lead of Hansen 1985), we now understand that
such movements of the workforce add to the
total volatility of hours of work.
In sum, by abstracting from life-cycle dif-
ferences, the representative agent framework
with immortal consumers proves to be useful for
answering a certain class of questions—namely,
those related to sources of impulse for the busi-
ness cycle. Even allowing for some heterogene-
ity, such as skill differences, these models ease
the computational difficulties because the equi-
librium can be computed by solving the opti-
mization problem of a stand-in social planner.
Table 1
Indicators of Skill Versus Hours Worked
Wage groups
1 2 3 4 5
Hourly real wage 1.48 2.37 3.28 4.46 7.24
Annual hours worked 1,112 1,556 1,795 1,920 2,009
Standard deviation 579 529 479 415 341
of hours worked
Years of education 11.18 11.97 12.73 13.00 14.30
NOTE: The table contains averages across individuals and is based on data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics for the period 1969–82. Each individual is grouped by aver-
age real wage over the sample period.The brackets used for each wage group are 0 to 2,
2 to 2.8, 2.8 to 3.8, 3.8 to 5.3, and 5.3 and over, in 1969 U.S. dollars. Ríos-Rull chose
these boundaries because they result in similar numbers of people per bracket.
SOURCE: Ríos-Rull (1993, 896).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       7 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1997
Nonetheless, the business-cycle model is
quite different from our Economy 1, especially
with its omission of the life-cycle earnings 
profile, so the question remains: Would the
introduction of the life-cycle dimension of het-
erogeneity change the conclusions drawn from
business-cycle models? Until recently, computa-
tional difficulties made answering this question
infeasible. However, advances in computing
capabilities have allowed researchers to com-
pute artificial economies both with and without
heterogeneous/mortal consumers and compare
the results. Ríos-Rull (1996), using an overlap-
ping generations (OLG) framework, with the
hump-shaped earnings pattern described above,
finds that the implications for most business-
cycle issues, such as the role of technological
shocks, do not change if one switches from an
infinitely lived, representative-agent model with
no life-cycle behavior to a sophisticated demo-
graphic structure with mortal consumers. His
finding confirms the early guess by other econ-
omists that one can safely abstract from life-
cycle considerations when dealing with many
questions related to the business cycle.
5
Accounting for individual differences 
across generations
While the immortal consumer framework
works well for some questions, such model
economies are not of much use when asking
questions for which life-cycle behavior is likely
to be important for the answer. Many interesting
policy issues revolve around life-cycle behavior.
These include questions for which demographic
factors are important, such as the future impact
of immigration on the economy, Social Security
reform in light of the aging population, and the
impact of the baby boomers’ retirement on sav-
ings and interest rates. For such questions,
economists have known that another type of
model is required (one that is computationally
very intensive), where consumers are consid-
ered mortal and make their decisions based on
where they are in the life cycle.
Miller and Upton (1974), in their macro-
economics textbook, had already formulated a
special case of a life-cycle economy in which
each individual lives for four periods (I = 4).
Mimicking a lifetime divided into four parts, the
individuals in their model earn income only in
periods two and three but desire a smooth
stream of consumption. With this simple text-
book framework Miller and Upton shed quanti-
tative light on several issues, such as the time
path from a less developed to a fully developed
economy, the role of government debt, and
money’s role in the behavior of output and
other real aggregates when debt is denominated
in nominal terms.
Given the technology of the time, com-
puting the full equilibrium of such a model was
a major task—even for the small number of
generations. Instead, Miller and Upton con-
strained consumers to calculate their wealth on
the assumption that interest rates in all future
periods will be the same as in the current
period. In contrast, in the examples we discuss
in the remainder of this article, the models’ 
people understand how future interest rates will
adjust to clear markets. The resulting computa-
tional burden is heavy but, given the vastly
improved capabilities of today’s computers,
eminently feasible, even with a value of I much
greater than four (perhaps 55 or 60 if the model
uses a period length of one year).
In the remainder of this article, we focus
on examples of questions that can be addressed
using the mortal consumer framework en-
visioned by Miller and Upton and others.
Although many researchers have addressed life-
cycle issues, we focus on the work of two
researchers in this article because of space 
constraints. This is obviously not meant to be 
an exhaustive survey of the literature. Rather,
these researchers’ work provides representative
examples of the type of questions that can be
addressed using such a framework and of what
has been done to answer them. We chose the
work of Ríos-Rull because he has been instru-
mental in expanding this type of model to rele-
vant life-cycle questions. We chose Storesletten
because of his work on immigration and the
current national interest in this topic.
Demographics and savings. The change in
the age distribution of the population associated
with the aging of the baby boom generation has
sparked economists’ interest in the potential
impact on the national savings rate. Because
typical consumers tend to borrow when young,
save during middle age, and dissave during
retirement, people’s savings are affected by
demographic factors, especially age. In addition,
because a nation’s savings is the sum of all indi-
viduals’ savings, changes in the composition of
the population could drastically affect the
national savings rate. A policy issue associated
with this question is the effect the retirement of
the baby boom population will have on the
Social Security system—a question that has
recently become a hot topic in both the popu-
lar press and among economists.
6 Several
researchers have addressed the savings issue.
But, as mentioned earlier, we focus on the work8
of Ríos-Rull and Storesletten as examples of
what can be done using a mortal consumer,
OLG framework.
Ríos-Rull has made great strides in the
ability to deal with OLG models. His pioneering
models allow for uncertainty about individuals’
lifetimes as well as labor force productivity,
which affects individuals’ earnings differently,
depending on which stage of the life cycle they
are in. Ríos-Rull (1994) attempts to provide a
quantitative answer to the issue of how the
aging of baby boomers will affect savings rates
and interest rates in the future. He permits laws
of motion for population movement rather than
simply assuming constant population growth.
For example, in our notation from Economy 1,
the number of newborns in the following
period is given by m1,t+1. If the age-specific 
fertility rates are fi (which are readily quanti-
fiable from panel data), then this number can 
be written as
where zt is a stochastic term whose statistical
properties can be estimated from past popula-
tion data. In studies that include population
dynamics such as these, researchers have typi-
cally opted for a period length of five years, so
that a lifetime of ninety years corresponds to a
value of the parameter I of 18. Moreover, if 
the probability of surviving between age i and
age i + 1 is si, then mi+1,t+1 = simit for all i = 1, ...,
I – 1. In the lifetime decision problem, the util-
ity associated with age i would presumably 
be weighted by the unconditional probability 
of reaching age i, P
i –1
j =1 sj, as well as by the 
usual term involving the discount factor. 
Finally, a rule needs to be specified for how 
the assets of the deceased are divided among
the survivors.
With these features added to Economy 1,
Ríos-Rull calibrates the model with age-depen-
dent birth and mortality rates and simulates the
population distribution, with an associated asset
distribution, until a combination similar to the
current distribution is obtained. This is used as
the initial condition. Accounting for population
dynamics is especially difficult to do for the
United States because immigration is such an
important factor in the country’s population
growth. For that reason, Ríos-Rull considers
Spain, which like many Western countries is
experiencing an aging of its population due to
a baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s. As he
notes, “The aging of the population brings for-
ward a variety of very important issues as so
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many features of individual behavior are age-
dependent. The allocation of time between
work in the market and leisure, and the alloca-
tion of income between consumption and sav-
ings, are among the key variables for which the
age of the individuals is a very important deter-
minant” (1994, 1). Such a statement applies to
the United States as well as Spain; thus his find-
ings have implications for the U.S. economy.
Ríos-Rull reviews the economic implica-
tions of the baby boom based on two fertility
schemes (one using historic fertility and one
that assumes the current drop in fertility is per-
manent). In addition, for each of the two fer-
tility scenarios, he considers alternative paths
for productivity growth, an open versus closed
economy, and alternative asset distributions. His
main findings suggest that the aggregate savings
rate will be reduced, but the amount of reduction
depends on the fertility scheme used. Under the
historic fertility scenario, the reduction in sav-
ings is relatively small—at most, a reduction of
2 percentage points at the lowest value. But,
under this scenario, the aggregate savings rate
rises again as the baby boom exits the economy
(after the year 2010). In contrast, based on the
permanent fertility scheme, aggregate savings
rates decline sharply over the entire period—
about 12 percentage points from 1980 to 2040.
Immigration’s impact on savings and fiscal
policy. A policy issue that has spurred debate
both in the press and among economists is the
effect of immigration on the U.S. economy.
Opponents of immigration suggest that immi-
grants are “stealing” U.S. jobs and that immi-
grants do not contribute to the country’s welfare
because they are less educated, have lower
wages, and are more likely to require social
assistance. On the other hand, proponents for
immigration suggest immigrants are hard work-
ers who already have an education and give
back to the country by saving and investing.
Economists have joined in the debate on
the impact of immigration. In a survey article
based on his own and others’ work, Borjas
(1994) suggests that on balance, current immi-
gration policy may be detrimental to the U.S.
economy. He finds that the newer waves of
immigrants to the United States have lower
wages relative to Americans and are unlikely to
reach parity with U.S. native wages over their
work life. He concludes that the increase in the
flow of less skilled immigrants may have been
partly responsible for the decline in the earnings
of unskilled U.S. workers during the 1980s.
Borjas also indicates that immigration may have
an adverse fiscal impact on the United StatesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       9 ECONOMIC REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 1997
because the new waves of immigrants partici-
pate in welfare programs to a greater extent
than the previous waves of immigrants.
Storesletten (1997) positions the impact of
immigration in a more positive light, suggesting
immigration can be beneficial to the U.S. econ-
omy—helping to offset a decline in savings as
the baby boom generation begins to retire and
possibly even sustaining current fiscal policy in
the face of rising public expenditures associated
with an older population. Building on the work
of Ríos-Rull, Storesletten takes the finitely lived
consumer, OLG framework one step further 
by modifying the population dynamics of the
model to include both natives and immigrants.
He calibrates a general equilibrium model to
U.S. data and creates a role for immigration
where immigrants are separate distinct agents.
The individuals in his model differ in national
origin and age at the time of immigration. The
key difference between immigrants and natives
in the model is in labor productivity, which is
strongly influenced by the age at the time of
arrival. Children of immigrants are assumed to
be identical to natives.
Impact on savings. Storesletten’s (1995)
findings indicate that changes in immigration
policy can significantly affect projected savings
rates and interest rates in the United States. First,
he solves his model under current immigration
policy, and then he explores three alternative
immigration policies, which range from shutting
down all future immigration to doubling the
current level of immigration. Under the current
policy, he finds that the aging of the U.S. popu-
lation is likely to cause the savings rate to
decline as the baby boom population moves
into retirement—the decline being 3.6 percent-
age points from peak to trough (2036). This
finding is consistent with the work of other
researchers that suggests the aging of the baby
boom population will negatively affect aggre-
gate savings, with Storesletten’s work providing
a quantification of this effect.
Findings from the alternative scenarios
suggest savings rates are quite sensitive to
changes in immigration policy. In fact, the pro-
jected savings rates from different scenarios 
differ by as many as 3 percentage points at 
the trough. Storesletten’s results indicate that 
by boosting immigration quotas, savings rates
would be higher than under current immigra-
tion policy. Under one scenario—increasing
future immigration to twice the current level—
there is an instant increase in the U.S. savings
rate of 0.4 percentage point relative to the base
case, and the difference between the two rises
to about 1.4 percentage points by the year 2041.
In contrast, by shutting down all future immi-
gration, the projected savings rate falls 0.5 per-
centage point below the base scenario, and the
difference between the two projected savings
rates rises by 1.5 percentage points over the
next fifty years. These results arise because the
population ages faster without immigration
(immigrants on average tend to be younger than
natives, as shown in Figure 4).
Impact on fiscal policy. It is a widely held
view that maintaining government expenditures
at current levels without a significant increase in
taxes will not be a practical policy for the U.S.
government as the population ages. For exam-
ple, Social Security and Medicare—major play-
ers in fiscal policy—transfer wealth from the
young working population to the old. With the
aging trend of the U.S. population, such pay-
ments will become a larger liability for the gov-
ernment in future years, at the same time that
there will be fewer workers to pay for it. This,
combined with the current budget deficit,
makes future tax increases seem inevitable.
Storesletten (1997), on the other hand, argues
that changes in immigration policy could reduce
the need to raise taxes on future generations—
and that by changing immigration policy alone,
current fiscal policy could be sustained. Be-
cause on average new immigrants are younger
than the native population but still old enough
to have acquired some education, an increase in
immigration has an impact on the age structure
Figure 4
Age Distribution of U.S. Natives 
And New Immigrants












































NOTE: The figure shows the age distribution of natives in 1991 and
the average distribution of new immigrants over 1982–88.
SOURCE: Kjetil Storesletten, Institute for International Economic
Studies, Stockholm University.10
of the population, which in turn increases 
government receipts by more than it raises gov-
ernment expenditures.
To illustrate the quantitative impact of
immigration policy on fiscal policy, Storesletten
examines whether there exists a class of immi-
gration policies that could sustain fiscal policy at
the current level, in the sense that the current
debt will eventually be paid off without a tax
increase. Using his OLG model with immigra-
tion, his findings suggest that such policies do
exist if immigrants are added, most of whose
ages range from the mid-twenties to the late for-
ties. A particular implementation of the policy is
to increase annual immigration to roughly four
times the current level, assuming all the new
immigrants are in their thirties. Such a policy
turns out to be an alternative, in his model, to
raising the income tax rate by about 5 percent-
age points. While this is a dramatic change in
immigration policy, the example illustrates that,
even for less extreme scenarios, significant fiscal
relief could be achieved and that immigration
policy can be viewed as an important tool in the
determination of fiscal policy.
Concluding remarks
In concluding, we return to our initial
question: Does being different matter? And the
answer is: It depends. Many quantitative macro-
economic issues can be addressed using models
that abstract from life-cycle behavior. For exam-
ple, many business-cycle and long-run growth
questions can be answered in an immortal 
consumer framework in which everyone is alike
and lives forever. Such questions might in-
clude: What percentage of business cycles are
accounted for by technology shocks? By mone-
tary shocks? By changes in fiscal policy? For this
class of questions, differences across genera-
tions have been found not to matter to any de-
gree of quantitative importance. Still, although
dissimilarities across generations may not be
relevant to this class of questions, individual 
contrasts  within generations, such as skill varia-
tion, may be. Researchers have found that it is
relatively easy to introduce some such differ-
ences into the immortal consumer framework
and still be able to compute the models with
relative ease.
There is another class of questions for
which individual differences—both across 
generations and within generations—matter a
great deal. These are questions in which demo-
graphics are at the heart of the issue. Such ques-
tions can be addressed using an overlapping
generations framework in which consumers are
mortal and make decisions based on where they
are in the life cycle. Issues that dictate this type
of life-cycle framework include the quantitative
impact of an aging population on savings rates
and interest rates and the quantitative effect of
alternative immigration policies. While it is still
computationally difficult to solve such models,
as computers become ever more powerful and
theoretical advances are made, the scope of
questions that can be addressed with the help of
such models is broadening steadily.
7
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1 This question is addressed in Kydland and Prescott
(1982).
2 For an overview of the use of such model features,
especially as they relate to the labor market, see
Kydland (1995).
3 See Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991).
4 For a recent extension see Prasad (1996).
5 An exception is the Altig–Carlstrom (1991) study of
the cyclical implications of the interaction of inflation
with personal tax rates when taxes are not fully
indexed. The issue addressed by them dictates an
OLG framework with life-cycle earnings profiles. For
example, a progressive income tax schedule implies
cyclical bracket creep to an extent that depends on
where the worker is in the life cycle.
6 See Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995).
7 Recently, researchers have even begun to explore
questions about institutional arrangements that may
arise when people vote. For example, Krusell and
Ríos-Rull (1994) study the quantitative implications for
capital accumulation arising from different systems of
collective choice of taxes as reflected in the frequency
of elections and the lag between policy decision and
policy implementation. Cooley and Soares (1995)
investigate how a pay-as-you-go Social Security sys-
tem is maintained by subsequent voters even though it
is not actuarially fair. A methodological challenge of
such models is that they require both an economic
and a political equilibrium.
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